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NbRTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Constitutional Law-Validity of Parking Meter Ordinances
The North Carolina Supreme Court recently held that a parking
meter ordinance exceeded the power of a municipality to regulate park-
ing.1 The court decided that there was no substantial relation between
the meter charge and the prevention of parking for an unreasonable
length of time; that the meter charge was not a proper inspection fee;
that the power to regulate did not authorize the imposition of a tax
upon the privilege sought to be regulated; and that the ordinance vio-
lated a statute restricting municipal license fees on operating motor ve-
hicles to $1.00.
In -determining the validity of parking meter ordinances, the follow-
ing questions have arisen :2
Does a Municipality Have the Power to Charge a License Fee as a
Reasonable Means of Regulating Parking?
The authority of a municipality to regulate parking is universally
recognized, whether such authority be derived from statutes authoriz-
ing regulation of traffic and the use of the streets3 or specifically author-
izing the regulation of parking.4 The standards of reasonable regulation
are fundamentally the same in both instances, the courts upholding only
those regulations which have a substantial relation to traffic safety.5
'Rhodes, Inc. v. Raleigh, 217 N. C. 627, 9 S. E. 389 (1940).
2 Problems, other than those discussed, presented by the parking meter cases
are: (a) Does a municipality have power to pledge revenue from parking meters
to pay for their purchase and installation? By the great weight of authority this
power exists: Franklin Trust Co. v. Loveland, 3 F.(2d) 114 (CCA 8th 1924);
Ward v. Chicago, 342 Ill. 167, 173 N. E. 810 (1930); Brockenbrough v. Water
Comm'rs., 134 N. C. 1, 46 S. E. 28 (1903) (pledge of tolls or rents from water-
works to pay for their installation). But see Brodkey v. Sioux City, 291 N. W.
171, 175 (Iowa 1940) (a parking meter case) "We have affirmed the rule that
the pledging by a city of revenue is unauthorized in absence of specific statutory
authority"; Van Eaton v. Sidney, 211 Iowa 986, 231 N. W. 475, 71 A. L. R. 820
(1930). (b) May a municipality delegate to a commissioner the power to install
meters at his discretion and regulate their use? See Brodkey v. Sioux City, 291
N. W. 171, 173 (Iowa 1940). (c) Is the licensing of the exclusive use of parking
meter spaces for one hour a leasing of property dedicated to public use? See
Birmingham v. Hood-McPherson Realty Co., 233 Ala. 352, 172 So. 114, 116
(1937) (suggesting that such exclusive use would be a leasing) ; cf. Schilling v,
Melbourne (1928), Vict. L. R. 302, 16 B. R. C. 45 (holding an ordinance invalid
which purported to permit drivers to park vehicles in certain designated street
zones for one shilling per day). But see In re Opinion of Justices, 8 N. E. (2d)
179, 182 (Mass. 1937).
'State ex rel. Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314 (1936) ; Rhodes,
Inc., v. Raleigh, 217 N. C. 627, 9 S. E. (2d) 389 (1940). See cases cited infra
note 6.
' Clark v. New Castle, 32 D. & C. 371 (Pa. 1938) ; County Court of Webster
County v. Roman, 3 S. E. (2d) 631 (W. Va. 1939). Notice that the N. Y. VF-
HICLE CODE, §54, as amended by N. Y. Pub. Laws of 1937, c. 502, specifically
authorizes use of parking meters in municipal traffic regulation.
'District of Columbia v. Smith, 68 App. D. C. 104, 93 F. (2d) 650 (1937)
(upholding an ordinance prohibiting parking between 2 a.m. and 8 p.m. to facili-
tate snow removal); State v. Carter, 205 N. C. 761, 172 S. E. 415 (1934);
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A decided majority6 of the parking meter decisions have upheld the
meter fee as a reasonable means of regulating parking, if imposed in a
zone in which municipal regulation for parking is permitted, ruling, in
effect, that "... whatever tends to make regulation effective is a
proper exercise of that power. It justifies the charge of a fee and the
imposition of a penalty.
' 7
The opposite and minority view is expressed by the Rhode Island
court, which held that without specific delegation of authority a mu-
nicipality could not exact a fee for parking, since a statute delegating
power to regulate parking ". . cannot be enlarged by implication un-
less that is necessary to make the statute effective and to accomplish its
object."'
The instant case did not question the power of a municipality gen-
erally to secure regulation by means of a license fee although the power
to license is not specifically delegated. Instead, it was held that a mu-
nicipality had no power to impose a particular license fee which neither
bore a "substantial relation" to parking regulation, nor constituted a
proper license fee; hence, the court concluded that it must be an excise
tax, and as such could not be imposed under the police power to regu-
late parking.9
Is the Revenue Derived So Excessive As to Make the Ordinance a
Taxing Measure?
Few cities have express authority to tax the use of city streets for
revenue. Where this power exists, however, an ordinance imposing a
tax upon parking would seem valid.Y0 But where a parking meter or-
Wonewoc v. Taubert, 203 Wis. 73, 233 N, W. 755, 72 A. L. R. 229 (1930) (up-
holding an ordinance prescribing manner of parking).
' State ex rel. Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314 (1936) ; In re
Opinion of Justices, 8 N. E. (2d) 179 (Mass. 1937) ; Hendricks v. Minneapolis,
290 N. W. 427 (Minn. 1940) ; Gilsey Bldgs., Inc., v. Great Neck Plaza, 170 Misc.
945, 11 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 694 (Sup. Ct., 1939) ; Ex parte Duncan, 179 Okla. 355,
65 P.(2d) 1015 (1937) ; Clark v. New Castle, 32 D. & C. 371 (Pa. 1938) ; Owens
v. Owens, 8 S. E. (2d) 339 (S. C. 1940); Harper v. Wichita Falls, 105 S. W.
(2d) 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Ex parte Harrison, 122 S. W. (2d) 314 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1938); County Court v. Roman, 3 S.. E. (2d) 631 (W. Va. 1939)
(strong dissenting opinion by Fox, President). Contra: Birmingham v. Hood-
McPherson Realty Co., 233 Ala. 352, 172 So. 114 (1937); Rhodes, Inc., v. Ra-
leigh, 217 N. C. 627, 9 S. E. (2d) 389 (1940) ; In re Opinion to House of Repre-
sentatives, 9 R. I. 94, 5 A.(2d) 455 (1939).
' Buffalo v. Stevenson,- 207 N. Y. 258, 100 N. E. 798 (1913) (upholding mu-
nicipal ordinance requiring a paid -permit to open any city street to connect with
a sewer, water, or power main).
8 59 R. I. 94, 5 A. (2d) 455, 457 (1939) (italics supplied) ; see dissenting opin-
ion in County Court of Webster County v. Roman, 3 S. E. (2d) 631, 634 (W. Va.
1939); 1 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) §237.
' Rhodes, Inc., v. Raleigh, 217 N. C. 627, 630, 9 S. E. (2d) 389, 391 (1940).
"0A license fee on the operation of a motor vehicle imposed by a !.ome rule
city in Ohio has been upheld as a valid excise tax under OHio CoNSTr.. art. XVIII.
§3; Saviers v. Smith, 101 Ohio St. 132, 128 N. E. 269 (1920). Accord: State
1940]
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tdinance is passed as a regulatory measure under the police power, no
greater fee should be charged than is necessary to cover the costs of
supplying the privilege and regulating its use." For a municipality
cannot under "the guise of a police regulation impose a revenue tax
where it has no authority to impose a revenue tax.'
12
But courts give great weight to the presumption that a license fee
is reasonable ;13 this may be overcome only by showing a glaring dis-
crepancy between revenue and administrative costs.' 4 The burden of
proving such discrepancy rests upon the complainant, and necessitates
proof not only of the revenue of the meters and the expense of install-
ing them but proof of all the expenses of regulating parking.'" The
courts have indicated that they may consider expenses of police pa-
trolling, costs of maintaining records, possible liability for torts arising
from parking supervision, and, perhaps, loss by wear on the roads as
among those "incidental expenses."' 0 Thus, it is not surprising that
only one court to date has ruled the parking meter ordinance invalid
because of excessive revenue,17 and that a Florida case sustained a
parking meter ordinance which brought a township $55,000 annual
revenue as opposed to $4,000 annual expenses for maintaining meters.18
The question of reasonable revenue was never raised in the principal
case, although in their nine months of operation Raleigh's parking me-
ters, installed for $10,000, collected a total revenue of $11,494.19
It is 'interesting to speculate upon the possible decisions of these
courts should a glaring 'discrepancy be revealed between the revenue
from the meters and the expenses of administration over a substantial
ex rel. Zielonka v. Carrel, 97 Ohio St. 220, 124 N. E. 134 (1939) (recognizing
the power of home rule cities in Ohio to place an excise tax on occupations).
Note (1938) OHIO STATE Unv. L. J. 198 (discussing parking meter fees as an
excise tax).
"In re Opinion of Justices, 8 N. E. (2d) 179 (Mass. 1937) ; Ex parte Dun-
can, 179 Okla. 355, 65 P.(2d) 1015 (1937); Ex parte Harrison, 122 S. W. (2d)
314 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938). 3 MCQUILLAN, MUNIcIPAL COPORATIONS (2d ed.
1928) 1089, 1102.
" 4 CooTEY, TAxATI oN (4th ed. 1924) §1680. Accord: State v. Beam, 91 N. C.
554 (1884).
"s State ex rel. Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314 (1936); Ex
Sparte Holt, 74 Okla. 226, 178 Pac. 260 (1918); Clark v. New Castle, 32 D. & C.
371 (Pa. 1937); Gilsey Bldgs. v. Great Neck Plaza, 170 Misc. 945, 11 N. Y.
Supp. (2d) 694 (Sup. Ct., 1939). 2 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIoNs (5th ed.
1911) §672.
"'Atkins v. Phillips, 26 Fla. 433, 8 So. 409 (1918) ; State ex rel. Harkow v.
McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314 (1936) ; Van Baolen v. People, .40 Mich. 258
(1878). 2 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CoR'PORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) §592.
15 See cases cited infra note 18.
"State ex rel. Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314, 317 (1936);
Hendricks v. Minneapolis, 290 N. W. 428, 430 (Minn. 1940); Clark v. Newr
Castle, 32 D. & C. 371, 381 (Pa. 1938).'T Brodkey v. Sioux City, 291 N. W. 171 (Iowa 1940).
"State ex rel. Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314 (1936) ; Amer-
ican City, Aug., 1936, p. 56.
" Popular Government, July-Aug., 1940, p. 11.
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period of time.20 For there is authority that a municipal ordinance will
not be impeached because "incidentally the city's receipts of moneys
are increased," unless this increment is so excessive as to indicate that
the ordinance was literally passed "for tax purposes."2 1 Furthermore,
most courts regard the parking fee as having a regulatory force. Clark
v. New Castle states: "The novel feature of the parking device is that
not only does the nickel toll pay the cost of regulation, but it is the
nickel itself which regulates. Rather than pay the nickel the motorist
will park elsewhere than in the restricted street, or will cut his stay
short."
22
If it can be proved that a smaller fee would not effectively accom-
plish regulation, a fee yielding excessive revenue might escape invalid-
ity, as being necessary for effective regulation. But if the court should
find, as it did in the principal case, that the ordinance "does not depend
in any way upon the meter charge, but, as heretofore, upon a specifica-
tion of the period during which it is lawful to park,"23 this contention,
resting upon a contrary presumption, necessarily fails.
Is the Installation of Parking Meters an Unwarranted Invasion of the
Public's Right to Free and Unobstructed Use of the Streets?
In as much as the right of passage is subject to reasonable regula-
tion,24 any permanent obstructions on the highway designed to promote
such regulation, such as sign posts, elevated safety zones, and stop
signs, are permissible. Thus, the parking meter device if reasonably
designed to promote traffic regulation would not be an actionable nui-
sance per se 5 The public's right to free passage is generally considered
an absolute right which cannot be subjected to charge by municipali-
ties. 26 Parking, however, is generally defined as a mere privilege, inci-
dent to this right of passage and free use of the streets.2 7 Thus, it is
"Recent reports of parking meter revenues suggest that they are producing
revenue far in excess of administrative costs: American City, May, 1936, p. 87;
July, 1939,.p. 53; June, 1940, p. 46; Oct., 1940, p. 13, 99. Notes (1937) 22 IowA
LAw REv. 713; (1937-38) 4 Onio L. J. 198; (1939) 3 UNIv. DmoI L. J. 22.
' See Van Baolen v. People, 40 Mich. 258 (1879) ; cf. Mankato v. Fowler,
32 Minn. 364, 20 N. W. 361 (1884) ; see Atkins v. Phillips, 26 Fla. 281, 302 So.
429, 432 (1890); see State ex rel. Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So.
314, 317 (1936); note (1931) 75 A.L.R. 17 and cases cited.
-32 D. & C. 371, 378 (Pa. 1937); cf. Harper v. Wichita Falls, 105 S. W.
(2d) 150 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). For reports of effect of parking meters on
traffic safety see citations infra note 50.
22 Rhodes v. Raleigh, 217 N. C. 627, 631, 9 S. E. (2d) 389, 391 (1940).
2, See State ex rel. Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 .Fla. 433, 171 So. 314, 316
(1936) ; 2 ELLioTT, ROADS AND STREETS (4th ed. 1926) §828.
2" See In re Opinion of Justices, 8 N. E. (2d) 179, 181 (Mass. 1937).
"See Harper v. Wichita Falls, 105 S. W. (2d) 743, 750 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937). See note 27, supra.
27 Owens v. Owens, 8 S. E. (2d) 339, 343 (S. C. 1940) ; see Harper v. Wichita
Falls, 105 S. W. 743, 750 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). Accord: Welsh v. Morristown,
1940]
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analogous to the privileged use of the streets by taxis, busses, and car-
riers, which may be charged a license fee independent of the limited
license fee upon all motor vehicles. 28 This rather elusive distinction is
clearly recognized in Ex parte Duncan.29 There the court declared that
a statutory restriction on a municipality's power to license the free use
of the public highways did not forbid a license fee on the privilege of
parking. However, the North Carolina court has interpreted a statute
limiting the fee a municipality may impose upon the privilege of oper-
ating a motor vehicle to $1.00,30 as excluding imposition of any other'
fee by a municipality for use of the streets by motor carriers.,, Accord-
ingly this statute is construed in the instant case to prohibit a license
fee on the parking privilege.
Stopping a vehicle to load or unload passengers or freight is gen-
erally recognized as a right incident to that of passage.3 2 Many of the
later parking meter ordinances, including the one in question, specifi-
cally exempt vehicles thus engaged from the operation of the statute.8a
Even in the absence of such a provision, the courts usually read it in,
either ruling that such stopping is an incident of passage 4 or that a
vehicle being loaded cannot be considered parked-a parked car being
by definition unattended.3 5
The Alabama Supreme Court ruled that a city departed from the
98 N.J. L. 630, 121 Atl. 697 (Sup. Ct. 1923) ; Ex parte Duncan, 179 Okla. 355,
65 P.(2d) 1015 (1937).
28 Southeastern Exp. Co. v. Charlotte, 186 N. C. 668, 120 S. E. 475 (1923);
Ex parte Holt, 740 Okla. 226, 178 Pac. 260 (1919). Accord: Ewing v. Leaven-
worth, 226 U. S. 464, 33 Sup. Ct. 157, 57 L. ed. 303 (1913); note (1924) 31
A. L.R. 589.
2 179 Okla. 355, 65 P(2d) 1015 (1937).
'0 MOTOR VEmIcrx AcT, c. 2, §29, N. C. Pub. Laws 1921; N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie 1935), §2612a. Compare statutory limitation invoked in other parking
meter cases: Shreveport v. Brister, 194 So. 566 (La. 1940) ; Monsour v. Shreve-
port, 194 La. 569 (La. 1940).
21 State v. Fink, 179 N. C. 712, 120 S. E. 475 (1923) (invoking N. C. Public
Laws of 1919, c. 189, §5). But ef. Southeastern Exp. Co. v. Charlotte, 186 N. C.
668, 120 S. E. 475 (1923) (holding N. C. Public Laws of 1921, c. 2, §29 consti-
tutional, said act authorizing municipalities to charge a license fee not exceeding
$50 against intra-urban carriers).
-2Pugh v. Des Moines, 176 Iowa 593, 156 N. W. 892 (1916); cf. Lowell v.
Pendleton Auto Co., 123 Ore. 383, 261 Pac. 415 (1927); Wonewoc v. Taubert,
203 Wis. 73, 233 N. W. 755 (1930). Compare Haggenjos v. Chicago, 336 Ill.
573, 168 N. E. 661 (1921) (holding invalid'an ordinance prohibiting all parking
in Chicago's loop district) with Chicago v. McKinley, 344 Ill. 279, 176 N. E. 261
(1931) (upholding a subsequent ordinance prohibiting all stopping but that for
purposes of loading or unloading passengers or freight).
"Section 12 of the Raleigh parking meter ordinance provides: "During ac-
tual loading and unloading of delivery vehicles within said parking zones, the
operator of such vehicles shall be exempt from the provisions of this ordinance."
"Ex parte Duncan, 179 Okla. 355, 65 P.(2d) 1015 (1937).
" Gilsey v. Great Neck Plaza, 170 Misc. 945, 11 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 694 (Sup.
Ct, 1939); Clark v. New Castle, 32 D. & C. 371 (Pa. 1938).
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terms of a -dedicatory deed when it charged a fee for parking.36 Park-
ing was discussed as an incident of that "free use of the streets" (as a
right and not a privilege), which had been secured to the public in the
deed. This decision applied the rule that a trustee municipality may
be enjoined against deviating from the terms of a dedicatory deed at
the suit of any injured part. Other cases granting such injunctions
have denied that a municipality was authorized under the deed to erect
telephone poles, install railway lines, or widen the streets to the de-
struction of the sidewalks.ar But heretofore none has held that a dedi-
catory deed could place a limitation upon the power of a municipality
to regulate traffic and the use of the streets.
Does the Installation of Parking Meters Constitute an Unreasonable
Interference with the Property Rights of Abutting Land Owners
So As to Deprive Them of Property without Due Process?
Another basis for the Alabama decision was that rights of the plain-
tiff as an abutting land owner had been violated by the installation of
parking meters in front of his property.38 The rights of abutting land-
owners vary in each state,3 9 yet most courts agree that an abutter pos-
sesses an absolute right of ingress and egress, whether labeled as
easements or property rights,40 which cannot be terminated or even
restricted except in case of public necessity. 41 Generally, however, the
municipality is admitted to have authority to determine where and in
what manner a property owner shall exercise this right.
42
The Alabama court states unequivocally that "the right of ingress
and egress is necessarily burdened with the right, within reasonable
limitations, of parking a vehicle or car" and that any fee charged the
abutting owner for the exercise of this right is an obstruction to that
" Birmingham v. Hood-McPherson Realty Co., 233 Ala. 352, 172 So. 114
(1937).
' Brown v. East Point, 149 Ga. 18, 95 S. E. 962 (1918); Collier v. Baker,
160 Tenn. 571, 27 S. E. (2d) 1085 (1930); Road Comm. v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry., 115 W. Va. 647, 177 S. E. 530 (1934) ; note (1935) 41 A. L. R. 1410.
" Birmingham V. Hood-McPherson Realty Co., 238 Ala. 352, 172 So. 114
(1937).
" See Savier v. New York, 206 U. S. 536, 27 Sup. Ct. 686, 57 L. ed. 117
(1906) aff'g 180 N. Y. 27, 72 S. E. 579 (1904).
"' The abutter's right of access is generally considered a property right if he
owns the fee in the street and an easement if the fee is held by the city; State
v. Burkett, 119 Md. 609, 87 Atl. 514 (1913); see In re Ollinger, 160 App. Div.
96, 103, 145 N. Y. Supp. 173, 179 (1st Dep't. 1914).
"Breinig v. Allegheny, 2 A (2d) 842 (Pa. 1938).
"Boston v. Perry, 22 N. E. (2d) 627 (Miss. 1939) (upholding ordinance
prohibiting construction of driveways across certain busy sidewalks) : Fowler v.
Nelson, 213 Mo. App. 82, 246 S. W. 638 (1923) (held that abutter with rear
alley had no absolute right to construct a driveway across busy sidewalk). See
Gilsey Bldgs. v. Great Neck Plaza, 170 Misc. 945, 11 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 604
(Sup. Ct., 1939). 3 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) §1125.
19401
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free access and hence unconstitutional. 43 But by the weight of authority
an abutter has no right or private easement to park in front of his
property different from that incidental privilege of parking he shares
with the public in its easement of travel.44 And the courts uniformly
hold that once upon the public highway he is subject to all the regula-
tions and limitations imposed on the traveling public in general.45
When an abutting owner proves that parking meters in front of
his place of business drive away customers, who rather than pay the
parking fee will go elsewhere and deal with his competitors, he may
prove a loss of property which the courts have in many instances pro-
tected.46 Certainly if the abutting owner can present substantial evi-
dence that enforcement of the ordinance constitutes an arbitrary
discrimination against him, the courts will grant him relief.47 Whether
or not the courts will invalidate a regulation which indirectly discrimi-
nates between particular enterprisers because of their location depends
upon the reasonableness of the measure as an exercise of police
power. Zoning ordinances which place similar discriminating restric-
tions on business and property rights solely on the basis of their location
have been consistently upheld, when found to have a substantial relation
to promoting public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.48
Current reports from municipal governments indicate that parking
"Birmingham v. Hood-McPherson Realty Co., 233 Ala. 352, 172 So. 114
(1937). This conclusion that an abutting owner has an absolute right to park
before his property finds support in decisions granting injunctions against taxi
stands on the street adjoining complainant's property; Eubank v. Yellow Cab Co.,
84 Ind. 144, 149 N. E. 647 (1925) ; Odell v. Bretney, 93 App. Div. 607, 87 N. Y.
Supp. 655 (1st Dep't 1904); and against motorists who consistently park before
complainant's property for an unreasonable length of time; Decker v. Goddard,
233 App. Div. 139, 251 N. Y. Supp. 440 (4th Dep't 1932) rev'g 139 Misc. 824,
249 N. Y. Supp. 381 (Sup. Ct., 1931).
"' Montgomery v. Parker, 21 So. 452, 454 (Ala. 1897); Duluth v. Esterley,
115 Minn. 64, 131 N. W. 791 (1911).
" See Clark v. New Castle, 32 D. & C. 371, 388 (Pa. 1938). Accord: Jones
Beach Boulevard Estate, Inc. v. Moses, 368 N. Y. 362, 197 N. E. 313 (1935)
(denying that an abutting owner had any right to ignore ordinance prohibiting
-left turn, though thereby he was required to go ten miles out of his way to reach
his property). See cases cited supra note 54. But see Birmingham v. Hood-
McPherson Realty Co., 233 Ala. 352, 172 So. 114 (1937) (considering stopping
as an incident of abutter's right of access, hence not subject to charge).
"' See Lauf v. Shinner & Co., 82 F.(2d) 68, 72 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936), re'z/d 303
U. S. 323, 58 Sup. Ct. 578, 82 L. ed. 872 (1938). Accord: Callahan v Gilman,
107 N. Y. 360, 14 N. E. 264 (1887) (recognizing special damage to complainant's
business interests by D's use of loading platform across sidewalk nearby, obstruct-
ing the passage of complainant's potential customers).
' TYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L. ed. 220 (1885);
see Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 94, 47 Sup. Ct. 675, 71 L. ed. 1228, 53
A.L.R. 1210 (1927).
"'Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114, 71 L. ed. 303, 54 A. L. R.
1016 (1932) ; Larrabee v. Bell, 56 App. D. C. 121, 10 F.(2d) 986 (1926) ; Appeal
of Parker, 214 N. C. 51, 197 S. E. 706 (1939). 3 WILLOUGHBY, THE CoNsTITU-
TIoN or THE UNITD STATES (2d ed. 1929) §1190. Cf. note (1924) 32 A. L. R. on




meters are proving singularly effective in traffic regulation, diminishing
the difficulty in finding parking spaces, reducing the number of patrol-
men necessary to regulate parking, and in some instances, apparently
reducing the number of traffic accidents by as much as thirty-five per
cent.49 Moreover they seem to be rapidly acquiring public approval.
wherever installed. If these reports are representative, a more lenient
judicial attitude toward parking meters appears warranted.50 But it is
becoming increasingly apparent that revenue derived from the five-
cent-per-hour fee generally imposed far exceeds any reasonable estimate
of the costs of regulating parking,5' and this issue may well be the
determining factor in future parking meter decisions.
V. LAmAR GUDGER.
Deeds-Defective Registration as Breach of Warranty.
A recent North Carolina decision, Dorman v. Goodmnan,' has re-
ceived considerable attention and has inspired some comment 2 as an
important ruling on an aspect of the recording and registry laws,
namely, the effect of improperly indexing the name of the grantor. An-
other, and perhaps equally important, holding in the case was disre-
garded by the comment in the Harvard Law Review, and was almost
ignored by the court itself. Accordingly, the case raises an unusual
question concerning the legal remedies of persons damaged by the
operation of registration statutes.
In 1925, A conveyed a parcel of land to B by warranty deed which
was recorded, but the entry in the "grantors" index was defective by
reason of a wrong initial. In 1925, B conveyed to C by warranty deed
one half of the parcel of land, and in 1930, B conveyed the remaining
half to C by warranty deed. Both of these deeds were properly
recorded andi indexed. In 1932, C conveyed the land to D by warranty
deed properly recorded and indexed. In 1934, judgments against A,
which had been obtained in 1926, were docketed by X. Execution was
issued and the land sold by the sheriff, being bid in by D. D now sued
C for breach of warranty of title. The court held that these judgments,
when docketed, became a lien upon the land in question because of the
improper indexing of the deed from A to B. The court further held
that this encumbrance was in breach of the warranties -contained in the
deed from C to D. Only fourteen words of the opinion were devoted
to this latter holding: ". . . In breach of the covenants and warranties
in the deed from defendants to plaintiff."
'" American City, July, 1939, p. 53; June, 1940, p. 46; Oct., 1940, p. 13.
5 American City, Dec., 1939, 9. 63; June, 1940, p. 81; Oct., 1940, p. 99.
"' See note 22, supra.
1213 N. C. 406, 196 S. E. 352 (1938).
2 Note (1938) 52 HARV. L. REv. 170.
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